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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL OF WASSAU, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
MONTROSE STEEL COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14426 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant commenced this action by obtaining a writ of 
garnishment based upon a verified complaint and affidavit. 
The complaint recites that Respondent is a Nevada corporation, 
not qualified to do business in Utah. Respondent did not 
answer but moved to quash on the grounds that the court was 
without jurisdiction because requisites for long arm juris-
diction under the Utah long arm statute were not satisfied 
even if all of the allegations of the complaint were admitted. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court quashed service of process and released 
the writ of garnishment (R-24) on the grounds that the court 
was without jurisdiction "over the defendant or the subject 
matter" (our emphasis). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By the nature of the proceedings, the facts must be 
presumed to be as alleged in the complaint (R~l). In essence 
they are: 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation licensed to do business 
in the State of Utah and Defendant is a corporation resident 
of and doing business in the State of Nevada. 
2. On May 16, 1975, Defendant was doing work under a 
subcontract for Gibbons & Reed Company and Defendant at that-
time had in its employ, Kenneth Harris of Nez Perce, Idaho. 
3. As a part of the subcontract agreement with Gibbons 
& Reed Company, Defendant furnished Gibbons & Reed for the 
use and benefit of Plaintiff, a representation that Defendant 
v/as insured for Workmen's Compensation coverage by the Nevada 
State Insurance Fund and that said coverage included its 
employee, Kenneth Harris. 
4. On or about May 16, 1975, Kenneth Harris injured 
himseld while in the employ of Defendant and thereafter made 
claim for such accident to the Nevada State Insurance Fund 
as its insurer. The Nevada State Insurance Fund denied the 
claim because Defendant was not so insured. 
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5. Plaintiff is the Workmen's Compensation carried 
for Gibbons & Reed Company, who in accordance with Idaho 
Code 72-216 is required to meet Workmen's Compensation 
obligations of Defendant because of Defendant's status 
as a subcontractor for Gibbons & Reed Company. Gibbons & 
Reed is by statute entitled to claim over and against De-
fendant for the amount of said claim/ which claim has been 
subrogated to Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff has further incurred an additional 
liability estimated in excess of $2,000 for continuing 
compensation and permanent partial disability. 
7. Defendant has present in this State a chose in 
action in the nature of a claim against Gibbons & Reed 
Company for the balance due under its subcontract in 
an amount of approximately $4,000. 
8. Appellant obtained a writ of garnishment based 
upon affidavit and verified complaint (R-10). 
9. Defendant owes Plaintiff a sum in excess of $4,000 
as a result of its misrepresentations and subrogated statu-
tory liability as aforesaid and Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment for the full amount of the claims of Kenneth Harris 
against it over and against Defendant. 
No question has been raised as to the sufficiency of the 
procedures by which the garnishment was effected (R-17). 
It must be assumed for this appeal (and it is in fact true) 
that there was compliance with Rule 64B in every particular. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IN REM JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURTS 
EXISTS INDEPENDENT OF THE UTAH LONG ARM 
STATUTE. 
The two grounds for Respondent's motion o quash were 
(1) the failure of the complaint to allege facts sufficient 
to justify the Utah court's assertion of in personam juris-
diction over the defendant under the Utah long arm statute 
(78-27-22 et seq. UCA 1953 as amended), and (2) Appellant's 
lack of status, as a foreigh corporation authorized to do 
business in Utah, to enjoy the benefits afforded to "citizens" 
by the statute. Both grounds erroneously assume the applica-
bility of the long arm statute. 
Jurisdiction is not here claimed on the basis of the 
long arm statute, but by virtue of the inherent power of the 
state's courts to adjudicate with reference to property 
within the state. Long arm statutes deal with the circumstances 
under which a state may assert extraterritorial in personam 
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Appellant here 
invokes the power of the state to deal with property within 
the state. The difference is the historically recognized 
distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction* 
Justice Holmes, in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 US 90, 37 
Su.Ct. 343, distinguished between the bases of jurisdiction 
in the two situations. In a garnishment or attachment situa-
tion, he said, "the foundation of jurisdiction is physical 
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power". There are various text treatments of the 
distinction between in personam and in rem jurisdiction, 
but all the authorities reach the same conclusion as to 
the state of the law. The Corpus Juris statement (21 CJS 
50, Courts 43) is as follows: 
"Jurisdiction over the res or property is the 
power of a court over the thing before it, 
without regard to the persons who may be 
interested therein, and the presence of the 
res within the territorial dominion of the 
sovereign power under authority of which the 
court acts may confer such jurisdiction. So 
where a nonresident has property within the 
jurisdiction the tribunals of a state may 
inquire into the nature and extent of his 
obligations, and in connection therewith 
may control the disposition of such property 
or may appropriate it to satisfy the claims 
of citizens of the state. While in a proper 
case a state court may render a judgment in 
personam and control the acts of the parties 
regarding property outside the jurisdiction 
of the state, if a nonresident over whom the 
court has not otherwise obtained jurisdiction 
has no property in the state its courts cannot 
adjudicate his liability to citizens of the 
state. In an action in rem, jurisdiction of 
the court over the property, as the subject 
matter of the suit, attaches at the institu-
tion of the suit." 
This court commented along Holmesian lines on the foun-
dation of in rem jurisdiction in Upper Brouch Irrigation Co. 
v. Continental Bank, 93 U 325, 72 P2d 1048. The issue was 
raised there, as here, in a due process context. The relevant 
quote from the decision is: 
"The district court is a court of general 
jurisdiction. The debt owing by the bank to 
the district by reason of the funds on deposit 
was one over which the general powers of the 
court extended." 
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The specific jurisdictional issue of the instant case 
was raised in Bristol v. Brent, 36 U 108, 103 P 1076^ The 
action was commenced by garnishment of a debt (the debtor 
being a Utah resident) owed to a non-resident defendant. 
The trial court assumed jurisdiction, and it was challenged 
on appeal. Although the matter was remanded to permit 
amendment of pleadings, this court clearly ruled that the 
trial court had jurisdiction with regard to the debt. Bristol 
was approvingly cited by the present Court very recently in 
Brown & Associates, Inc. v. Carnes Corp. filed March 16, 1976. 
There are cases from nearly every state which can be 
cited in support of the proposition we here advance. One 
which received considerable media attention was Caton v~ 
Reuther, 170 NE2d 835. The Massachusetts court there held 
the property of an international union in the state (includ-
ing debts owed to it) to be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court so that such property could be applied to the 
satisfaction of any indebtedness for which all the union 
members were liable, and notice to international union members 
by substituted service under the court rules was sufficient 
to permit application of such property quasi in rem. 
The power of state courts to deal with in-state property 
of (including debts owed to) non-residents has been infrequently 
questioned in the last decade. There has been a continuing 
controversy in legal literature about the degree to which 
federal courts have or ought to have a similar basis of 
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jurisdiction. It is generally recognized that a plaintiff 
cannot commence an action in a federal court by attaching 
property in the forum state of a non-resident of the state 
in which the court sits. If the action is so commenced in 
a
 state court and then removed to the federal court system, 
the federal court has jurisdiction. The following excerpt 
from an annotation at 30 ALR2d 231 is pertinent: 
"Attention is called to the fact that the rule 
that a federal court does not have quasi in rem 
jurisdiction such as may be assumed in attachment 
and garnishment proceedings, is limited to actions 
commenced in a federal court, but does not apply 
to actions commenced in a state court and removed 
to a federal court. Moreover, even in an original 
suit a federal court may enforce, against a non-
resident debtor, a lien created by attachment or 
garnishment proceedings instituted in a state 
court." 
and see Curie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 
59 Michigan Law Review 337. 
In any event, the "minimal contacts" doctrine which 
controls in long arm cases has no relevancy here. A recent 
case which makes this precise point is U.S. Industries, Inc» 
v. Cregg, 348 F.Supp. 1004 (1972) in which the court said: 
"The 'minimal contacts' doctrine to which Cregg 
refers is not applicable when, as here, the 
plaintiff invokes the quasi in rem jurisdiction 
of the court. . . . a court (may) exercise 
jurisdiction over property within its jurisdiction 
regardless of the presence or absence of other 
contacts with the forum state". 
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POINT II 
AS A FOREIGN CORPORATION QUALIFIED 
TO DO BUSINESS IN UTAH, APPELLANT 
HAS THE SAME ACCESS TO UTAH COURTS 
AS DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS OR OTHER 
PERSONS 
Respondent's argument to the trial court that Appellant 
is not a citizen and therefore not entitled to the benefits 
afforded "citizens" by Utah's long arm statute is subject 
to the initial refutation (as set forth in Point I) that 
the long arm statute has no application to the jurisdictional 
issue in this litigation. We submit, however, that the 
reference to "citizens" in the Utah statute is only in the 
statement of general purposes and not intended as a limita-
tion on the classes of entities to be benefited. 
The notion that foreign corporations qualified to do 
business in Utah, paying taxes and otherwise, subject to 
the control and contributing to the economy of the state 
are second class entities, so far as access to the state's 
judicial system is concerned, has no support in statutes, 
texts, or cases that we can find. 
Section 16-10-103 UCA 1953 as amended specifically 
treats powers of foreign corporations and provides: 
"A foreign corporation which shall have received 
a certificate of authority under this act shall, 
until a certificate of revocation or of withdrawal 
shall have been issued as provided in this act, 
enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges 
as a domestic corporation organized for the purposes". 
It is not questioned in these proceedings that Appellant is 
fully qualified and certified in Utah. Appellant has, there-
fore, the same access to the courts and enjoys the same 
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benefits from legislation (including the long arm statute 
where it is applicable) as a domestic corporation. 
Even in the absence of a direct statutory pronouncement 
of the kind above quoted, American courts have consistently 
held that foreign corporations can pursue the remdies of 
attachment and garnishment in states where they are qualified* 
American Jurisprudence comments on the point at sections 
63 and 222 of its treatise on Attachment and Garnishment-
Recognizing that many states will not give an unqualified 
foreign corporation access to their courts, the editors say, 
nonetheless, that "an action of attachment by a foreign 
corporation which had not, at the time of commencing it, 
complied with the statutory requirements to enable it to 
do business in the state will not be dismissed on motion 
if, at the time of the motion, it has so complied" ( 6 Am 
Jur 2d 606). 
The editors cite Standard Oil Co. v. Superior Ct. , 44 
Del 538, 62 A2d 454, Aero Spray, Inc. v. Ace Flying Service, 
139 Colo. 249, 338 P2d 275, and Vfestern Urn Mfg. Co. v. An. -
Pipe & Steel Corp, 284 F2d 279, as authority for these 
statements: 
"An action commenced by process of foreign 
attachment or garnishment may be instituted 
by a non-resident or a foreign corporation 
authorized to do business within the state, 
against a foreign corporation owing property 
or credits within the state, although the non-
resident plaintiff's cause of action arises, 
or the obligation on which it is based is made 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 10 -
and is payable, in another state and the 
defendant corporation was not doing business, 
or was not qualified to do business, within 
the state. A foreign corporation not qualified 
to do business within the stats has been held 
entitled to invoke such a remedy against a 
foreign corporation also not qualified." 
(6 Am Jur 2d 720) 
It is significant that appeal of Standard Oil v. Sup. Ct«, 
supra, was dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court, 336 US 930, 
69 S.Ct. 738. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in reaching the conclusion that 
it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter in the circum-
stances of this case. Respondent relies wholly on cases 
construing the long arm statutes as support for the argument 
that a Utah court's assertion of such jurisdiction would 
violate due process guarantees. Such statutes and such cases 
have no relevancy here. Appellant invokes in rem jurisdiction 
in pursuing a traditional remedy in the traditional manner. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 1976. 
,^ ,--. s*~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Mailed two copies of Brief of Appellant to Kenneth L. 
Rothey, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, postage prepaid, 
this 19th day of April, 1976, at 2275 South West Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84115. 
' FRANK J. ALLEN 
/ 
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